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Many contemporary concerns (e.g., addiction, failure to save) can be viewed as intertempo-
ral choice problems in which the consequences of choices are realized at different times.
In some laboratory paradigms used to study intertemporal choice, non-human animals
demonstrate a preference for immediacy (impulsive choice) that results in failures to
maximize the amount of reward received. There is evidence, however, suggesting that
such non-optimal impulsive choice may be due to a mismatch between the standard
presentation of options in the laboratory (e.g., a “larger-later” and a “smaller-sooner”
option) and the way that options occur in natural settings (e.g., foraging). We present
evidence that human impulsive choice is similarly affected: in two experiments, decisions
were more optimal when options were presented in a format sharing features with the
evolutionarily important problem of foraging compared to when options were presented in
the standard format.These ﬁndings suggest a more nuanced view of intertemporal choice
and support the adoption of ideas from foraging theory into the study of human decision
making.
Keywords: intertemporal choice, impulsive choice, delay discounting, self-control, impulsivity, decision making,
foraging
INTRODUCTION
Important social concerns, such as addiction, obesity, and debt,
can be conceptualized as intertemporal choice problems—choices
between consequences that are realized differently through time
(Madden and Bickel, 2010). Intertemporal choice is frequently
studied by having subjects choose between two mutually exclu-
sive reward, where the smaller reward is available sooner and
the larger reward is available later (Figure 1A), a task that has
been called the self-control paradigm (Logue, 1988). To vary-
ing degrees, human and non-human animals in the self-control
paradigm show a preference for smaller-sooner reward, called
impulsive choice, even when such preference is non-optimal in
that it decreases the total amount of reward received (Madden
and Bickel, 2010). Here, we demonstrate that human intertem-
poral choice appears to be at least partially due to the manner
in which options are presented in laboratory tasks. Addition-
ally, we argue that researchers should consider a broader view
of intertemporal choice—one that takes into account choice prob-
lems other than the larger-later/smaller-sooner presentation of the
self-control paradigm.
INTERTEMPORAL CHOICE BY NON-HUMAN ANIMALS
Experiments on non-human animals typically ﬁnd that delaying
reward causes them to lose much of their value, a phenomenon
referred to as temporal or delay discounting (Madden and Bickel,
2010). For example, Stephens (2002) estimated that the ﬁrst sec-
ond of delay caused food rewards to lose 75% of their value for
pigeons in the classic self-control paradigm experiment by Mazur
(1987). Additionally, the proportion of choice for the larger-
later reward relative to the smaller-sooner reward is commonly
quite low. For example, Tobin and Logue (1994) reviewed three
experiments—one using rats (Tobin et al., 1993) and two using
pigeons (Mazur and Logue, 1978; Logue et al., 1985) and showed
that, on average, rats and pigeons picked the larger-later option
only 20% and 3% of the time, respectively, despite the fact that it
provided three times more food than the smaller-sooner option.
Furthermore, non-human animals’ choices in the self-control
paradigm seem to be determined almost entirely by the delay until
receipt of a reward (i.e., the prereinforcer delay), rather than other
timing components, such as delay following receipt of reward (i.e.,
postreinforcer delay; e.g., Logue et al., 1985; Mazur et al., 1985). As a
result, choice of the smaller-sooner option is usually non-optimal
in the sense that it produces less food over the course of a ses-
sion than the larger-later option. For example, Logue et al. (1985)
found that impulsive choice by pigeons resulted in receipt of only
34.6% of the food that could have been obtained. Such ﬁndings
are often interpreted as showing that non-human animals lack
self-control—they forego the beneﬁts of delaying gratiﬁcation by
impulsively choosing the more immediately available reward.
Importantly, the self-control paradigm is only one of the ways
in which researchers have studied intertemporal choice by non-
human subjects. Animals’ foraging behavior in nature also involves
choosing between options that differ in value and in time until
consumption, and biologists have long studied such intertemporal
choice from theperspective of Optimal ForagingTheory (Stephens
andKrebs, 1986). For example, a starling foraging for food in a plot
of grass faces the choice of continuing to spend time searching in
that location or to spend time ﬂying to a new location that might
offer better or more food. This example can be analyzed using the
patch model (Charnov, 1976; Stephens and Krebs, 1986): in an
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FIGURE 1 | Schematics for the self-control and patch paradigms.
(A) Self-control: trial t begins at Startt. When the participant reaches the
choice point, Ct, he or she must decide between amount Al (after a delay
of dl ) and amount As (after a delay of ds ). (B) Patch: the participant waits
for the duration of the inter-trial interval (ITI), then waits for the duration of
ds and receives As . At Ct the participant chooses to either receive Al –As
after a delay of dl –ds , or begin a new trial. (C) The self-control and (D) the
patch paradigm viewed from the ﬁrst choice point, C1. Note that at C1 in
patch, the total delay to As includes the ITI for the second trial, whereas
the ITI has already passed when a subject reaches C1 in the self-control
paradigm. (E) Schematic representing bird’s-eye view of the laboratory
set-up in experiment one.
environment where food is more densely distributed in particular
locations, or “patches,” a forager will inevitably experience dimin-
ishing returns as food in the occupied patch is depleted. Thus, the
optimal decision-making strategy is determined by comparing the
present rate of intake in the patch to the rate of intake that can
be expected elsewhere in the environment, and to leave the patch
when doing so is likely to result in achieving a higher rate of gain
[i.e., maximization of long-term rate (LTR) of food obtained dur-
ing a foraging bout]. Although rate maximization models like the
patch model often fail to completely explain observed behavior,
researchers tend to ﬁnd that animals are sensitive to LTR and that
behavior is at least in qualitative agreementwithmodel predictions
(Stephens and Krebs, 1986; Nonacs, 2001).
Given that choice during foraging and choice in the self-control
paradigm are both forms of intertemporal choice, an important
issue is why the assumption of LTR maximization, which has
served well when predicting behavior in the foraging literature,
has consistently fared less well when predicting behavior in the
self-control paradigm? To investigate this discrepancy, Stephens
and Anderson (2001) designed the patch paradigm (Figure 1B),
which reframes the larger-later/smaller-sooner choice of the self-
control paradigm as a leave/stay choice, akin to that which animals
must make when foraging in patches. They compared the choices
of blue jays in the two paradigms for which delays to the small and
large reward (ds and dl), amounts of the small and large reward
(As andAl), and the duration of intertrial interval (ITI) were set so
that the LTRs for each option, AsITI+ds and
Al
ITI+dl were equal across
paradigms.
A simple LTR-maximizing rule can be formulated based on
the difference between the LTRs of two options: let LTR be the
change in LTR when Al is picked instead of As , such that
LTR = Al
ITI + dl −
As
ITI + ds
When LTR > 0, a choice of Al maximizes LTR, but when
LTR < 0, a choice of As maximizes LTR. When LTR = 0, nei-
ther option is superior in terms of LTR. Stephens and Anderson
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(2001) found that the jays made decisions that were more consis-
tent with the LTR rule when in the patch paradigm compared
to in the self-control paradigm—that is, the jays’ decision-making
was more optimal in the patch paradigm than in the self-control
paradigm—a pattern of results we will refer to as the patch effect.
Stephens and Anderson’s (2001) results led them to formu-
late the ecological rationality hypothesis of impulsivity (see also
Stevens andStephens,2010),which is that the impulsivity observed
in the self-control paradigm is due to the fact that the self-control
paradigm is a poor model of the natural choice problems that
organisms have evolved to solve. Speciﬁcally, they proposed that
animals have evolved to make decisions based on an assessment
of only the time until the next reward [i.e., short-term rate
(STR) maximization], and they observed that when a decision
rule akin to the LTR rule above is formulated for STR, fol-
lowing the STR rule results in choosing the same option as
following the LTR rule in the patch paradigm, but can result
in a violation of the LTR rule in the self-control paradigm.
This occurs because, in the patch paradigm, every delay follows
a choice and ends in reward receipt, whereas in the self-control
paradigm, the ITI occurs after receipt of reward and before choice,
and so is ignored in the calculation of STR (Figures 1C,D).
The proposal that non-human animals use a STR-based rule is
supported by the ﬁnding that they mostly ignore postreinforcer
delays (e.g., Logue et al., 1985; Mazur et al., 1985), as well as
the descriptive power of delay discounting models that hold that
discounted value is a function of only the prereinforcer delay
(e.g., the hyperbolic model; Mazur, 1987). Moreover, ﬁndings
from several recent experiments suggest that delay discounting
by monkeys is in fact attributable to the under-estimation of
the postreinforcer buffer, a type of postreinforcer delay that, in
some versions of the self-control paradigm, follows choice of
the smaller-sooner reward (Pearson et al., 2010; Blanchard et al.,
2013).
Subsequent direct tests (using blue jays) have shown that sub-
jects do not purely use STR-maximization strategies, thereby
making such an explanation of the patch effect unlikely; how-
ever, some methodological explanations for the patch effect have
been ruled out, and similar results to those of Stephens and
Anderson (2001) have been reported (Stephens and McLinn,
2003; Stephens and Dunlap, 2009). Additionally, the behav-
ioral difference between paradigms is indirectly supported by
other experiments in which the behavior of subjects of the
same species is poorly explained by LTR-maximization when
observed in the self-control paradigm, but well-explained by
such a strategy when observed in foraging tasks: for example,
Bateson and Kacelnik (1996) found that starlings’ choices were
better explained as STR-maximization than as LTR-maximization
in three experiments using the self-control paradigm, but differ-
ent individuals from the same species have been found to behave
approximately optimally in patch-foraging experiments (Kacel-
nik, 1984; Cuthill, 1985). Likewise, rats have been found to choose
impulsively in the self-control paradigm (e.g., Tobin et al., 1993),
but optimally under some conditions in a patch-foraging task
(Mellgren et al., 1984). The implication of these ﬁndings is that
intertemporal choice varies as a function of the speciﬁc problem
being faced, and that a fully developed theory of intertemporal
choice must take into account more than just the self-control
paradigm.
EXAMINING HUMAN BEHAVIOR IN THE PATCH PARADIGM
There is an extensive literature documenting correlations between
human intertemporal choice in the self-control paradigm (usually
operationally deﬁned as a discounting rate) and outcomes such
as addiction, pathological gambling, and the presence of psychi-
atric disorders (Madden and Bickel, 2010). Indeed, some have
argued that overly steep delay discounting should be considered
a trans-disease process (i.e., a process underlying multiple phys-
ical, mental, and behavioral disorders; Bickel et al., 2012), and
researchers have begun investigating ways to modify delay dis-
counting (e.g., Koffarnus et al., 2013). Furthermore, much work
has been done toward elucidating the neural mechanisms that
mediate choice in the self-control paradigm (Peters and Büchel,
2011).
Given the amount of interest in human intertemporal choice,
an obvious question is whether humans, like blue jays, behave
more optimally in the patch paradigm than in the self-control
paradigm. If so, this ﬁnding would be important for the interpre-
tation of results fromexperiments using the self-control paradigm,
since it would suggest that non-optimal behavior by an individual
in the self-control paradigm does not necessarily mean that that
individual behaves the same way during all forms of intertemporal
choice. Furthermore, understanding the cause of the patch effect
would help researchers better understand the nature of intertem-
poral choice in the self-control paradigm, which will ultimately
be necessary for a complete understanding of why steeper rates of
discounting might be a trans-disease process.
The goal of the present experiments was to determine whether
humans’choices weremore optimal in the patch paradigm as com-
pared to the self-control paradigm—that is, to test the patch effect.
To do this, we adopted the procedures of Stephens and Anderson
(2001) for use with human subjects. Previous work has found
that in versions of the self-control paradigm that were similar
to ours, participants tended to make decisions that were broadly
consistent with the use of a LTR-maximizing strategy (e.g., Logue
et al., 1986; Flora and Pavlik, 1992; Ito and Nakamura, 1998).
For example, in Logue et al.’s (1986) Experiment 1, participants
chose the LTR maximizing option 61% of the time on average,
and participants in such experiments have reported consciously
trying to maximize LTR (Logue, 1988). Therefore, we predicted
that participants would generally make choices that were consis-
tent with the LTR rule, regardless of paradigm; however, we
also predicted that we would ﬁnd evidence for the patch effect
in that participants’ decisions would be better predicted by the
LTR rule in the patch paradigm compared to in the self-control
paradigm.
We tested both of these predictions in two experiments. Experi-
ment 1 was based on the procedure Stephens andAnderson (2001)
used with blue jays inasmuch as our human participants needed to
move between different locations to make their choices. In other
words, this design involved spatially distinct patches, a feature
shared by all previous experiments testing the patch effect. The
procedure in Experiment 2 was identical to that of Experiment
1, except that all trials were completed at a single computer by a
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Table 1 | Short- and long-term rates for choosingAs andAl in the self-control and patch paradigms for all combinations of duration assignments
(ITI, ds, and dl).
Duration
assignments
Short-term rates (STR) for choosing
As andAl in self-control
STRs for choosingAs
andAl in patch
Long-term rates (LTRs)
forAs andAl
ITI ds dl As Al STR As Al STR As Al LTR
0.5 0.083 1 301.2 50 −251.2 42.88 27.26 −15.62 42.88 33.33 −9.55
1.5 0.083 1 301.2 50 −251.2 15.79 27.26 11.47 15.79 20 4.21
0.5 0.83 1 30.12 50 19.88 18.8 147.06 128.26 18.8 33.33 14.54
1.5 0.83 1 30.12 50 19.88 10.73 147.06 136.33 10.73 20 9.27
0.5 0.083 1.5 301.2 33.33 −267.87 42.88 17.64 −25.24 42.88 25 −17.88
1.5 0.083 1.5 301.2 33.33 −267.87 15.79 17.64 1.85 15.79 16.67 0.87
0.5 0.83 1.5 30.12 33.33 3.21 18.8 37.31 18.52 18.8 25 6.2
1.5 0.83 1.5 30.12 33.33 3.21 10.73 37.31 26.58 10.73 16.67 5.94
Delays are given in minutes, rates in terms of cents/minute. Note that, across conditions, the signs of STR and LTR are identical in the patch paradigm but not
in the self-control paradigm—thus, STR maximization results in LTR maximization in the patch paradigm, but not necessarily in the self-control paradigm. Values are
identical for both experiments.
seated participant, and rewards were not delivered at spatially dis-
tinct locations. This modiﬁcation was important because it more
closely resembled methods that are commonly used in research
on choice by humans in the self-control paradigm (e.g., Logue
et al., 1986), and it enabled us to evaluate whether the results from
Experiment 1 were caused solely by the fact that patches were spa-
tially distinct rather than by a substantive difference between the
patch and self-control paradigms.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
SUBJECTS
Participants [Experiment 1: N = 216 (79 male, 134 female, 3
unreported); Experiment 2: N = 163 (88 male, 75 female)] were
undergraduate Introduction to Psychology students at the Univer-
sity of Miami who completed sessions for partial course credit and
were paid the amount they earned from their choices (see below).
PROCEDURE
Sessions were completed with one participant at a time for Exper-
iment 1 and up to four participants at a time (in separate carrels)
for Experiment 2. Experimental sessions were scheduled for 90-
minute blocks, and though participants were told that sessions
would take the full 90 minutes, the time spent depended on the
programmed delays for each condition.
In all cases, the large reward (Al) was worth $0.50 and the small
reward (As)wasworth $0.25. The ratio of themagnitudes ofAl and
As was chosen to match the ratio used by Stephens and Anderson
(2001), whereas the magnitudes themselves were chosen because
they are comparable to those in pervious experiments using sim-
ilar procedures (e.g., Flora and Pavlik, 1992) and because they
allowed us to represent the reward in terms of U.S. quarter dollar
coins (see SupplementalMaterials), whichwe guessedwouldmake
them easier for participants to conceptualize as compared to, for
example, $0.15.
For both experiments, participants were randomly assigned to
one of eight possible combinations of durations for ITI (30 or
90 s), delay to the small reward (ds : 5 or 50 s), and delay to the
large reward (dl : 60 or 90 s). These delays were taken from those
used by Stephens andAnderson (2001). Choosing the large reward
instead of the small reward resulted in varying degrees of LTR,
depending on the speciﬁc combination of durations (Table 1).
Paradigm order and color (see below) were counter-balanced.
At the beginning of the session, participants were told that
they would complete tasks that measure how people make deci-
sions about different amounts of money available after different
amounts of time, and that they would be paid the amounts they
chose. Each participant completed four forced-choice demonstra-
tion trials (two each for the patch and self-control paradigms)
and 20 experimental trials (10 for each paradigm). Experimental
trials were always preceded by the paradigm-appropriate pair of
forced-choice trials. In both experiments, E-prime 2.0 was used
to present options to participants, collect their responses, and
manage timing. See Figure S1 for example screenshots.
For Experiment 1, options were presented to participants on
three computer monitors placed around a modular cubicle set-up
(Figure 1E). Participants began trials at the point labeled “Home
Station.” A button was pushed to begin a trial and participants
waited for the duration of the ITI. Participantswere then presented
with one or two colored arrows.
For a Self-control trial, participants were simultaneously pre-
sented with a green and a blue arrow, one pointing right and one
pointing left. If, for example, the left arrow was blue and rep-
resented Al , and the participant preferred that option, he or she
clicked the blue arrow and then walked to the left (to the cubicle
labeled “Left Station” in Figure 1E). Upon arrival, the participant
pressed a button to begin dl . After the delay, the participant was
presented a screen detailing the earnings for the trial. This screen
included animated images of two U.S. $0.25 coins and was accom-
panied by a tone. The participant was then told to push a button
to end the trial and return to the starting point to begin another
trial. The side of the station associated with the larger-later reward
was counter-balanced across experimental trials.
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For a Patch trial, the participant was presented with a single
arrow that was the color of the small reward (e.g., green) and that
was either pointing left or right (counterbalanced across exper-
imental trials). If the arrow was pointing right, for example, the
participant clicked the arrow and thenwalked to his or her right (to
the cubicle labeled “Right Station” in Figure 1E). The participant
then pressed a button to begin ds . Following ds , the participant
was presented with a reward screen, including an animation and
tone, indicating the receipt of As . After receiving the reward, the
participant was presented with another screen indicating that he
or she could either wait for the other reward (blue, in this exam-
ple, worth $0.25, or Al–As) or press a button to end the trial. If the
participant ended the trial, he or she would then walk back to the
“Home Station”and begin a new trial. For all trials, a running total
of the amount participants had earned was kept at the bottom of
each screen.
Two programming errors occurred in the implementation of
this experiment. First, for conditions in the self-control paradigm
in which participants should have received a 90-s ITI, participants
received a 30-s ITI. Second, for conditions in which the larger-
later reward was assigned the color green and when options were
presented in the patch paradigm, participants were incorrectly
directed to collect the green reward at the start of the trial instead
of the blue reward. Supplemental analyses suggest that neither
error was ultimately of consequence (see Supplemental Methods),
but the results from Experiment 1 should be interpreted with these
errors in mind.
The procedures for Experiment 2 were identical to those of
Experiment 1, except that options were presented on a single
computer screen and participants were not required to walk to
receive reward. Additionally, all participants wore headphones so
that they could not hear the reward tones generated by the other
participants’ choices.
All procedures were approved by the University of Miami
Institutional Review Board.
STATISTICAL MODEL
Because each participant received 10 trials of each paradigm, data
conformed to a two-level nested structure (trials nested within
participants) in which paradigm was a within-subject factor and
duration assignment a between-subject factor. Data were analyzed
using a hierarchical linear model (HLM; Raudenbush and Bryk,
2001) in HLM version 7.01. This model was used to predict the
log-odds that the large reward was chosen in a speciﬁc trial as a
function of experimental treatment (i.e.,LTR) and the paradigm
within which the choice was made (patch, coded as 1, or self-
control, coded as 0). This analytic approach was used for both
experiments.
The outcome variable was modeled as ηij = the log-odds that
Al was chosen in trial i by person j, such that,
ηij = β0j + β1j
(
Paradigm
) + eij
β0j = γ00 + γ01 (LTR) + u0j
β1j = γ10 + γ11 (LTR) + u1j
where β0j and β1j are the intercept and slope coefﬁcients,
respectively, u0j and u1j are random effects representing the
remaining variation between participants’ individual intercepts
and slopes, and eij represents residual within-person variation.
The intercept (β0j) can be interpreted as the average log-odds for
individual j that Al will be chosen when all other factors are zero
(i.e., in the self-control paradigm). Differences between individ-
uals’ intercepts that are due to differences in LTR are modeled
as the coefﬁcient γ 01. The slope (β1j) represents the change in
the average log-odds for individual j when the trial occurs in
the patch paradigm rather than in the self-control paradigm.
Individual differences in this change that are due to differences
in LTR are modeled as the coefﬁcient γ 11. Missing data were
handled using full information maximum likelihood, which pro-
vides unbiased parameter estimates and does not impute any data
(Schafer and Graham, 2002). This modeling approach is prefer-
able to approaches that assume ﬁxed effects and require use of
mean proportions of choices because it allows for generalizability
beyond the samples used in our experiments and correctly models
the outcome as a binomial process.
RESULTS
Figures 2A,B show summary data for both experiments. Figure 3
shows model-predicted choices across a range of LTR.
For Experiment 1, all terms in the model were statistically sig-
niﬁcant; for Experiment 2, all terms except for the main effect for
paradigm were signiﬁcant (Table 2). When all predictors in the
model were zero—that is, when paradigm = 0 (i.e., a self-control
trial) and LTR = 0 (i.e., the LTRs of Al and As are equal) par-
ticipants were approximately twice as likely to choose Al as they
were to choose As in both experiments [Experiment 1 γ 00 = 0.80,
odds ratio (OR) = 2.22; Experiment 2 γ 00 = 0.79, OR = 2.21]. In
both experiments, this effect was modiﬁed by LTR, such that an
increase in LTR by one cent/minute resulted in 6% (γ 01 = 0.06,
OR = 1.06) increases in the likelihood of choosing Al . Thus, par-
ticipants showed a noteworthy preference for Al when it gained
them nothing, but participants were also sensitive to LTR in the
self-control paradigm (as predicted).
In Experiment 1, a general tendency to choose Al rather than
As was observed when choices were made in the patch paradigm
rather than the self-control paradigm and when LTR = 0
(γ 10 = 0.49, OR = 1.64). This difference was not predicted, and it
did not reach statistical signiﬁcance for Experiment 2 (γ 10 = 0.11).
The primary prediction for both experiments (i.e., that the
effect for paradigm would be modiﬁed by LTR), was supported:
when a choice was made in the patch paradigm, a one cent/minute
increase in LTR resulted in 4% (γ 11 = 0.04, OR 1.04) and 5%
(γ 11 = 0.04, OR = 1.05) increases in the likelihood of choosing Al
over As in Experiments 1 and 2, respectively (i.e., the patch effect)
over and above the effects obtained in the self-control paradigm.
The interactions between paradigm and LTR (γ 11) were
decomposed by examining simple intercepts and simple slopes at
each value of LTR (Table 3; Preacher et al., 2006). In Experiment
1, we observed the patch effect for all conditions in which LTR
was positive (the difference in estimated odds ratios for picking
Al instead of As ranged from 1.69 to 2.75; ps < 0.001). However,
in both paradigms, choice for As over Al when LTR was nega-
tive did not reach statistical signiﬁcance. It is worth noting that,
although not statistically signiﬁcant, the odds ratios for both the
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FIGURE 2 | (A,B) Box plots of summary data for Experiments 1 and 2 given as proportion of trials during which Al was picked across LTR conditions. Note
that for Experiment 1, data for four conditions are missing for the self-control paradigm (see the text).
FIGURE 3 | Model predicted probability of pickingAl by LTR,
paradigm, and experiment. Not all LTR values plotted were observed.
simple intercept and the simple slope when LTR = −17.88 were
in thepredicteddirection (Table 3). Additionally, at least half of the
choices by at least half of the participants were for As instead of Al
when LTR was negative (Figure 1A)—a distinctly different pat-
tern of behavior than what was observed when LTR was positive.
For Experiment 2, we observed the patch effect when LTR
was 5.94 or above: estimated odds ratios for choices in the patch
paradigm ranged from 1.45 to 2.12 higher than those in the self-
control paradigm (ps< 0.046; Table 3). This same effectwas nearly
statistically signiﬁcant for the condition where LTR was 4.21
(OR = 1.35, p = 0.095). As in Experiment 1, participants were less
successful at maximizing LTR when LTR was negative compared
to when it was positive. Speciﬁcally, when LTR = −9.55, the
odds ratios for both the simple intercept and the simple slope
were not statistically signiﬁcant (Table 3), and the majority of
participants in the patch paradigm choose Al instead of As the
majority of the time (which, in both experiments, represents the
only time participants failed to maximize LTR at least as well in
the patch paradigm as in the self-control paradigm; Figure 2B).
When LTR = −17.88, the patch effect nearly reached statistical
signiﬁcance (OR = 0.50, p = 0.089).
DISCUSSION
Our results contribute to a growing body of work that clearly
demonstrates that intertemporal choice varies with the speciﬁcs of
the procedure used to measure it. For example, when intertempo-
ral choice is operationalized as a discount rate, the value of future
reward apparently decreases faster for hypothetical consumable
reward (e.g., food) than for hypothetical monetary reward (for
a review, see Odum and Bauman, 2010). In addition, discount
rates seem to be affected by a variety of experimental manipula-
tions (Koffarnus et al., 2013). Intertemporal choice has also been
found to be dependent on experimental context when measured as
preference for the smaller-sooner reward (i.e., impulsive choice):
for example, impulsive choice is higher for consumable rewards
(e.g., juice; Logue and King, 1991), in the presence of visual food
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Table 2 | Results from both experiments based on a hierarchical linear model (HLM) predicting the log-odds of choosingAl as a function of LTR
and paradigm.
Experiments Level 1 Level 2 Coefficient Odds ratio 95% CI
1 Intercept, β0 Intercept, γ 00 0.80*** 2.22 1.71–2.88
LTR, γ 01 0.06*** 1.06 1.04–1.08
Paradigm, β1 Intercept, γ 10 0.49*** 1.64 1.23–2.19
LTR, γ 11 0.04** 1.04 1.01–1.06
2 Intercept, β0 Intercept, γ 00 0.79*** 2.21 1.75–2.78
LTR, γ 01 0.06*** 1.06 1.03–1.08
Paradigm, β1 Intercept, γ 10 0.11 1.12 0.79–1.59
LTR, γ 11 0.04* 1.05 1.01–1.08
*p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001.
Table 3 |The simple intercept represents a test of whether there is any preference forAl overAs in the self-control paradigm; the simple slope is
the change in this preference in the patch paradigm as compared to the self-control paradigm.
Simple intercepts Simple slopes
Experiments LTR Log-odds (SE) Odds ratio (p-value) Log-odds (SE) Odds ratio (p-value)
1 14.54 1.64 (0.20) 5.18 (p = 0.000) 1.01 (0.24) 2.75 (p = 0.000)
9.27 1.34 (0.17) 3.81 (p = 0.000) 0.82 (0.19) 2.28 (p = 0.000)
6.2 1.16 (0.15) 3.18 (p = 0.000) 0.71 (0.17) 2.04 (p = 0.000)
5.94 1.14 (0.15) 3.13 (p = 0.000) 0.71 (0.17) 2.02 (p = 0.000)
4.21 1.04 (0.14) 2.83 (p = 0.000) 0.64 (0.16) 1.90 (p = 0.000)
0.87 0.85 (0.13) 2.33 (p = 0.000) 0.53 (0.15) 1.69 (p = 0.000)
−9.55 0.24 (0.17) 1.27 (p = 0.149) 0.16 (0.18) 1.17 (p = 0.397)
−17.88 −0.25 (0.23) 0.78 (p = 0.277) −0.14 (0.26) 0.87 (p = 0.595)
2 14.54 1.60 (0.17) 4.93 (p = 0.000) 0.75 (0.27) 2.12 (p = 0.006)
9.27 1.30 (0.13) 3.69 (p = 0.000) 0.52 (0.21) 1.68 (p = 0.014)
6.2 1.13 (0.11) 3.11 (p = 0.000) 0.39 (0.19) 1.47 (p = 0.040)
5.94 1.12 (0.11) 3.07 (p = 0.000) 0.37 (0.19) 1.45 (p = 0.046)
4.21 1.02 (0.11) 2.79 (p = 0.000) 0.30 (0.18) 1.35 (p = 0.095)
0.87 0.84 (0.11) 2.32 (p = 0.000) 0.15 (0.18) 1.16 (p = 0.398)
−9.55 0.26 (0.20) 1.30 (p = 0.179) −0.31 (0.27) 0.73 (p = 0.256)
−17.88 −0.20 (0.29) 0.82 (p = 0.496) −0.68 (0.39) 0.51 (p = 0.086)
cues (Forzano and Corry, 1998), and when distractions are present
during choice (Kirk and Logue, 1996). For our results, the most
relevant of these types of ﬁndings is that in experiments most
similar to ours, participants apparently adopt LTR-maximizing
strategies, even when such strategies prescribe impulsive choice
(e.g., Logue et al., 1986; Flora and Pavlik, 1992; Ito and Naka-
mura, 1998). We replicated this ﬁnding in our two experiments
when LTR was positive (the simple intercepts in Table 3), and
found that, although not statistically signiﬁcant, at least half of
the subjects chose the smaller-sooner option on at least half of the
trials when LTR was negative (Figures 1A,B). Additionally, we
found that participants were generally more successful at maxi-
mizing LTR when options were presented in the patch paradigm
rather than in the self-control paradigm (i.e., the patch effect):
across the two experiments, the likelihood of choosing the LTR
maximizing option was statistically signiﬁcantly increased in 10
of 16 cases (ps < 0.05), and nearly signiﬁcantly increased in two
additional cases (ps < 0.10; see the simple slopes in Table 3), one
of which represented a LTR-appropriate reduction in preference
for the larger-later reward (i.e., LTR-maximizing, but impulsive
choice). Overall, our results (Figure 3) were broadly consistent
with the choices by blue jays reported by Stephens and Anderson
(2001).
The ﬁnding that participants apparently adopt LTR-
maximizing strategies in some versions of the self-control
paradigm but not others, and that the ability to maximize LTR
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is improved if options are presented as a foraging-style leave/stay
choice, suggests that choice in different contexts may be pro-
duced by different cognitive mechanisms. Other ﬁndings support
this conclusion, as well: the same person’s discount rate seems
to depend on the version of the self-control paradigm experi-
enced (e.g., questionnaire procedures or more operant-style ones;
Navarick, 2004), and discount rates across procedures are not
necessarily correlated (Lane et al., 2003a,b). Moreover, partici-
pants clearly do not use LTR-maximizing strategies when faced
with some popular questionnaire versions of the self-control
paradigm, such as the monetary choice questionnaire (MCQ;
Kirby and Marakovic´, 1996)—if they did, choice would exclu-
sively favor the smaller-sooner option, and discount rates would
be much higher than are typically reported (e.g., Carter et al.,
2012).
It is not clear what determines the choice strategy or mecha-
nism in use during different versions of the self-control paradigm,
or even why discounting rate can be modiﬁed by so many fac-
tors (Koffarnus et al., 2013); however, it is important to note
that even the most successful delay discounting models, such as
the hyperbolic model (Mazur, 1987), do not provide an expla-
nation for such context-dependence (van den Bos and McClure,
2013). These models are also limited in that they almost uniformly
describe discounted value as a function of only the prereinforcer
delay. This is problematic for cases where choice changes in the
face of manipulations of postreinforcer delays, since standard dis-
counting models can only account for such variation through
discounting parameters. For example, Flora and Pavlik (1992)
presented two groups of subjects with a choice between an imme-
diately available 4 points, worth one cent each, and 10 points after
15 s. The options presented to the groups differed only in that
one group was exposed to a postreinforcer delay of 15 s follow-
ing receipt of the smaller-sooner reward. In terms of LTR, the
addition of the postreinforcer delay switched the sign of LTR
for these conditions from negative to positive, and choice of the
larger-later reward between the two groups tracked this switch:
in the absence of the postreinfrocer delay, only one subject chose
the larger-later option, and only on a third of trials, whereas in
the presence of the postreinforcer delay, all subjects chose the
larger-later option on the vast majority of trials. Fitting a stan-
dard discounting model to these data would produce the result
that subjects in the two groups discounted future reward at very
different rates—that is, participants in the postreinforcer delay
condition would have appeared to discount delayed reward less
steeply than those in the condition lacking the postreinforcer delay.
Although possible, such an explanation is unlikely given that sub-
jects were taken from the same population and randomly assigned
to groups.
Standard discounting models fail to reasonably account for
choice in our experiments for similar reasons. In the self-control
paradigm, for conditions where LTR = −17.88, −9.55, 0.87,
or 4.21, the k values from the hyperbolic model at indifference
between Al and As would be k = 0.0125, 0.02, 0.0125, and 0.02,
respectively. In these conditions, preference for Al over As suggests
that participants’ k values are less than the k values at indifference,
and for conditions where LTR = 0.87 or 4.21, this seemed to be
the case (Figure 2B). However, if participants’ k values were that
small across groups (which, given random sampling, they likely
were), then participants also should have shown an equivalent
preference for Al in conditions where LTR = −9.55 or −17.88.
Instead, when LTR changed sign from LTR = 0.87 and 4.21 to
LTR = −17.88 and −9.55, which was achieved by manipulating
ITI, participants showed a decrease in choice for Al to the point
where neither Al nor As was preferred (see the simple intercepts in
Table 3; Figures 2A,B). If one is willing to assume comparable k
values across groups, then the hyperbolic model does not account
for our ﬁndings.
Critically, the patch effect is predicted by standard discount-
ing models in some cases. For example, in our experiment, for
conditions in LTR = 0.87 or 4.21, if participants’ k values were
greater than k = 0.0125 or 0.02, respectively, one would predict
preference for As in the self-control paradigm, but Al in the patch
paradigm. However, as mentioned, the data strongly suggest that
k values for these participants would be less than k = 0.02 (e.g.,
choice in the self-control paradigm when LTR = 4.21 in Exper-
iment 2 strongly favors Al , implying k < 0.02; Figure 2B), and
therefore not large enough to predict the patch effect. Of course,
the current experiments were not designed to assess individual
discounting parameters, so the appropriateness of standard dis-
counting models for our data cannot be truly tested. Considering
that variation in discounting parameters can predict the patch
effect, future experiments should be carefully designed to rule out
such a possibility.
Given our data, we can only speculate on the mechanism(s)
underlying the patch effect. One possibility is that the patch effect
is due to an improvement in participants’ ability to determine
which option maximizes LTR. Maximizing LTR is critically depen-
dent on being able to discriminate the LTRs of the options, and
the further LTR is from zero, the more obvious it is which choice
maximizes LTR. In line with this interpretation, we found that the
probability of choosing Al was positively related to LTR: γ 01 for
both experiments; Table 2 (see Shenhav et al., 2014 for a similar
discussion of human choice behavior on a foraging-type task).
The positive relationships between the probability of picking Al
and LTR increased during choice in the patch paradigm com-
pared to in the self-control paradigm (γ 11 for both experiments;
Table 2), which is consistent with the interpretation that the patch
effect is due to an increased ability to discriminate between the
LTRs of the two options.
One possibility for why discriminability might be improved
in the patch paradigm is that participants could be better able
to understand that they are facing a sequence of choices in the
patch paradigm, and so are more likely to consider the options
in terms of rates, rather than, say, simply the amount of reward
associated with an option. Given that one option in the patch
paradigm explicitly involves moving on to the next trial (i.e., the
leave option; Figure 1D), whereas no option in the self-control
paradigm relates to any trial beyond the current one (Figure 1C),
we ﬁnd this explanation to be particularly promising.
Future work can improve upon the experiments we report
here in several ways. First, one potential explanation for the
patch effect is that the pattern of reward receipt differs in the
two paradigms: in the patch paradigm, there are two deliveries
for the stay option, one of which is delivered right before the
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choice point (Figure 1B), compared to only one delivery in the
self-control paradigm, always following the end of the prerein-
forcer delay (Figure 1A). This might increase choice for the stay
option if, for example, reward delivery itself was rewarding above
and beyond the value of the reward received (e.g., by virtue of
interrupting a boring delay period). Stephens and Dunlap (2009)
examined the issue of multiple deliveries with blue jays by split-
ting the delivery of the larger-later reward in the self-control
paradigm up so that it exactly matched reward delivery of the
stay option in the patch paradigm. Interestingly, this manipula-
tion did increase choice for the larger-later reward in the modiﬁed
self-control paradigm as compared to the patch paradigm and
the standard self-control paradigm, but only when such choice
was inconsistent with LTR (i.e., a non-optimal preference for the
larger-later option). This is in line with the argument that sub-
jects are in fact motivated by multiple deliveries, but the same
blue jays preferred the leave option—the option with only one
delivery—to the stay option in the patch paradigm when leaving
was the LTR-maximizing option. These ﬁndings, in conjunction
with other data from blue jays showing LTR-consistent preference
for leaving in the patch paradigm (e.g., Stephens and Anderson,
2001), indicate that although a reward split into multiple deliv-
eries might be preferred to a reward delivered all at one time,
such preference is not enough to fully explain the patch effect.
Of course, the same cannot be deﬁnitively said for our human
participants, given that leaving in the patch paradigm was never
statistically signiﬁcantly preferred to staying (although it nearly
was for Experiment 2 when LTR = −17.88, and the strong pref-
erence for staying that was observed when LTR was positive
did reduce to at least indifference when LTR was negative and
leaving was the LTR-consistent option; Table 3). A direct test of
the multiple deliveries hypothesis using human subjects would be
useful.
It would also be beneﬁcial to conduct future experiments in
which various properties of the reward are manipulated. For
example, given that human subjects seem to behave less in line
with LTR-maximization when reward in the self-control paradigm
is consumable (e.g., Logue and King, 1991), testing the patch
effect for such reward would be useful. Additionally, the valid-
ity of the patch paradigm as an analog for patch-foraging could be
improved by setting the reward to more obviously diminish over
time. Although it wouldmake direct comparison to the classic self-
control paradigm more difﬁcult, the reward sequence for the stay
option could be split across more delivery events in such a way that
each subsequent reward was slightly smaller than the last. Previous
work with human subjects suggests that choice in such a context
would approximately track LTR-maximization (Hackenberg and
Axtell, 1993).
Furthermore, it might also be productive to manipulate the
information given to participants during choice. For example, it
may be the case that providing information about the total reward
earned biases behavior over time, so preference could be manip-
ulated by removing this information. Additionally, giving explicit
cues about the timing of non-prereinforcer delays, such as the
ITI, should improve choice (Pearson et al., 2010; Blanchard et al.,
2013). Manipulating such factors might help to ﬂesh out exactly
why the patch effect exists—for example, it might be the case that
the ITI is more salient in the patch paradigm, thereby making the
LTR-maximizing option more obvious.
Moreover, a better understanding of decision-making in the
patch paradigm could be obtained by continuing to examine how
choice changes when options are spatially separate, as in Experi-
ment 1. Relative to choice in Experiment 2, our subjects seemed to
prefer the stay option in the patch paradigmwhen leaving required
physically moving away from a station (Figure 3), even to the
detriment of maximizing LTR. Such “over-staying” is frequently
observed in patch foraging (Nonacs, 2001), and whether it is due
to some form of discounting by physical effort or adherence to
a type of “win-stay” strategy, it seems to be a regular feature of
decision-making during patch foraging. Unfortunately, Experi-
ment 1 was limited by two programming errors, and although
statistically accounting for the errors suggested that they were of
little consequence (see Supplemental Materials), it would be ben-
eﬁcial to repeat Experiment 1 in the future so as to have a solid
foundation from which to study the effect of physical movement
on choice in the patch paradigm.
Finally, future work could also expand on the present design
by testing alternative criteria for ending sessions. For example,
in the current work, it is possible that participants were aware
of the fact that the end of a session was trial-based rather than
time-based (despite being told otherwise). If so, the average bias
toward picking Al (γ 00 for both experiments in Table 2) might
have represented a strategy based on optimizing the total amount
of reward received over the number of trials allowed, rather than
the rate of reward calculated based on the time in a trial. However,
the fact that choice was sensitive to LTR at least indicates that
this strategy was not adopted by all participants or at all times.
Ruling this possibility out would be useful for future work using
either paradigm.
COMPARING LEAVE/STAY CHOICES TO
LARGER-LATER/SMALLER-SOONER CHOICES
Based onﬁndings such as ours (e.g., Stephens andAnderson, 2001)
it seems clear that any model or hypothesis about intertemporal
choice ought to address the structure of the choice problem being
faced. Onemight argue that considering instances of choice that do
not follow the larger-later/smaller-sooner structure is unnecessary
if the primary goal is understanding—andmodifying—real-world
examples of human behavior in which future consequences seem
to be devalued (e.g., addiction, gambling, obesity). Presum-
ably, such an argument would rest in part on the logic that
these real-world examples seem to be larger-later/smaller-sooner-
type choices (e.g., a choice between the short-term beneﬁts of
a drink versus the long-term beneﬁts of abstinence). However,
we think these examples can be proﬁtably seen as following a
leave/stay structure instead. For example, in the case where a
person addicted to alcohol is faced with the decision to drink
or to abstain, the choice to drink can be thought of as a choice
to engage in a stay strategy: engaging in a behavior to receive
some estimated payoff (i.e., the subjective value of the drink).
On the other hand, the choice to abstain can be thought of as
enacting a leave strategy: continuing to search out other options
based on the expectation of the types of payoffs that might be
encountered elsewhere (e.g., any potential beneﬁts to personal
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or professional relationships that might otherwise be put at risk
through drinking). Importantly, if this person were to choose
to drink when the option became available (the stay strategy),
he or she could then change his or her mind and stop drinking
(the leave strategy)—perhaps as the expected value of other pos-
sible outcomes in the environment increased. Thus, compared
to the larger-later/smaller-sooner conceptualization of this same
example, the leave/stay formalization models the mutual exclusiv-
ity of the options more realistically—that is, one cannot drink
and abstain at the same time, but a single choice to drink in
the moment does not forever remove the option of abstain-
ing in the future, as is suggested by the mutual exclusivity of
the smaller-sooner and larger-later reward in the self-control
paradigm.
Beyond considering real-world examples of impulsivity, a host
of other intertemporal choice problems can also be seen as taking
a leave/stay structure. For example, various authors have applied
essentially this same framework to decisions about when to halt
visual search (Wolfe, 2013), how to manage time while gathering
information (Pirolli, 2005), when to give up during problem solv-
ing (Payne and Duggan, 2011), when to engage in a task requiring
executive function (Kurzban et al., 2013), and when to stop spend-
ing time doing an “internal search,” as in recalling information
from memory (Wilke et al., 2009; Hills et al., 2012). Many other
problems neatly fall into this framework, although, to our knowl-
edge, have not been studied as such (e.g., decisions about when to
switch careers or leave a romantic relationship, about when to stop
preparing for an exam, even decisions about when to stop collect-
ing data during experimental research). Thus, given the apparent
ubiquity of leave/stay problems, we believe that any fully devel-
oped theory of intertemporal choice, including theories of how to
modify intertemporal choice, must account for how decisions are
made in this context.
CONCLUSION
Wefound that humanparticipants’choicesweremoreoptimal—in
the sense that they were more in line with LTR-maximization—in
the patch paradigm as compared to in the self-control paradigm
in 12 of 16 conditions across two experiments (with varying levels
of statistical signiﬁcance: ps from <0.10 to <0.001; Table 3). Fur-
thermore, choice in the patch paradigm maximized LTR at least
as well as, but in most cases better than, choice in the self-control
paradigm in all but one condition (Figures 2A,B).
A fully developed account of intertemporal choice must con-
sider the ways in which choice changes based on how options
are presented (e.g., as a larger-later/smaller-sooner choice or a
leave/stay choice). Our results add to a body of work that strongly
indicates that current discountingmodels are very limited descrip-
tions of intertemporal choice, and that researchers would do well
to consider choice paradigms beyond the self-control paradigm.
These points are important to consider for research on real-
world examples of impulsivity, since they suggest that efforts to
understand or modify such behaviors will depend crucially on the
ways in which they are operationalized. Speciﬁcally, if delay dis-
counting behavior is indeed a trans-disease process (Bickel et al.,
2012), is the same true of all intertemporal choice behavior? Or
is how an individual handles a larger-later/smaller-sooner choice
the only useful predictor of disease outcomes? Investigating such
questions will ultimately be critical to a full understanding of
intertemporal choice, both in the laboratory and in the real
world.
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